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Abstract 
 
 The paper provides theoretical and empirical justifications for the instrumentality of 
foreign aid in stimulating private investment and fixed capital formation through fiscal policy 
mechanisms. We propose an endogenous growth theory based on an extension of Barro (1990) 
by postulating that the positive effect of aid mitigates the burden of the taxation system on the 
private sector of recipient countries. The empirical validity is based on 53 African countries for 
the period 1996-2010. While the findings on the tax effort channel are overwhelmingly 
consistent with theory across specifications and fundamental characteristics, those of the 
government expenditure channel are a little heterogeneous but broadly in line with the theoretical 
postulations. Justification for the slight heterogeneity and policy implications are discussed.    
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1.  Introduction 
 International aid remains one of the most hotly debated topics in development economics. 
Accordingly, a recent strand of the literature has substantially raised concerns about foreign aid 
channels (Collier, 2007; Moyo, 2009; Banuri, 2013; Asongu & Jellal, 2013; Krause, 2013; 
Ghosh, 2013; Wamboye et al., 2013; Marglin, 2013; Monni & Spaventa, 2013; Titumir & 
Kamal, 2013; Kangoye, 2013; Asongu, 2014abc; Eubank, 2012). The accounts have included: 
neo-colonialism motivations (Amin, 2014; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013); need for more holistic 
processes (Amin, 2014; Obeng-Odoom, 2013) and; imperative for more self-reliance in Africa 
(Kindiki, 2011; Fofack, 2014).  
The Official Development Assistance (ODA) programs that were instituted over five 
decades ago have led to widely debated and unsolved issues about aid effectiveness. In 2005, 
Western countries tried most to save Africa as in July of that year, the Group of Eight (G8) 
agreed to double development assistance to Africa from $25 billion a year to $50 billion in order 
to finance the ‘Big push’, as well as cancel African aid-loans contracted during previous attempts 
at a ‘Bush push’. According to most estimates, prior to this effort, Africa was already the most 
aid-intensive region in the world (Asongu & Jellal, 2013, 2014). World leaders gathered at the 
United Nations in September of that same year to further discuss the progress of substantially 
mitigating poverty in the continent. As far as we have reviewed, Easterly (2005) best highlights 
some frustrating statistics. Accordingly, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) contains more than 11% of 
the world’s population but accounts only for 1% of the world’s GDP. In the median African 
country, 43% of the population survives on less than $1 per day. On the list of the World Food 
Program, of the twenty-three countries with more than thirty-five per cent of the population 
malnourished, seventeen (seventy-three per cent) are in Africa. Poverty has been sustained by the 
long and brutal civil wars in many countries (Angola, Chad, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Liberia…etc), Rwanda’s genocide and recent carnages in Darfur-Sudan with the Democratic 
Republic of Congo registering the world’s highest casualties since World War 2. To put it 
concretely, seven of the eight recent cases of total societal breakdown into anarchy have been in 
Africa: Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (beside Afghanistan). Thus foreign aid has been considered as a means of giving these 
war-torn countries a ‘Big economic push’.  
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 The issue of whether development assistance improves growth in recipient countries can 
be traced back to the two-gap model (Chenery & Strout, 1966), which remains the most 
influential theoretical underpinning of aid effectiveness in the literature. According to the 
narrative, developing countries face serious constraints on savings and export earning that deter 
investment growth. In spite of severe criticisms since its inception, this model has provided the 
underlying principles for early aid policies (Easterly, 1999) and empirical specifications in many 
studies (Masud & Yontcheva, 1999). Accordingly, both the Harrod-Domar and Solow growth 
models which constitute the principal theoretical underpinnings of the foreign aid literature are 
based on the need for large aid-finance boosts in investment in order to bridge the poverty gap.  
The effect of development assistance on private sector investment has long been an 
important issue of debate. Accordingly, many economists have taken the position that aid 
stimulates private investment in least developed countries (LDCs) by filling macroeconomic 
savings or foreign exchange gaps, while others have countered that aid has a negative effect on 
private investment because it is often wasted or counterproductive, generates Dutch-disease 
effects and enables the central government to compete resources away from the private sector 
(Snyder, 1996)
2
. However, recent empirical evidence suggests that, donors are concerned about 
how their aid is used, especially how it affects the fiscal behavior of recipient governments 
(Morrissey, 2012). The paper has reviewed the effects of aid and concluded that aid significantly 
affects government spending and tax effort in LDCs.  
 The present study position’s itself as an extension of Morrissey (2012). Hence, our main 
contribution of the literature is twofold. On the one hand, we propose an endogenous theory of 
aid and on the other hand provide empirical validity for the proposed theory. The model we 
propose postulates that the positive effect of aid reduces that burden of the taxation system on 
the private sector which ultimately leads to economic growth in poor countries, especially when 
the amount of aid is high and the public sector is less effective. Hence, the goal of the study is to 
examine how aid affects private investment through fiscal policy channels. We postulate that the 
effects of aid on tax effort and government spending as sustained by Morrissey (2012) could 
provide incentives for private investments and fixed capital formation needed for economic 
prosperity. By investigating this fiscal behavior mechanisms, the paper also throws more light on 
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 For instance Snyder (1996) has concluded from a panel of 36 developing countries that nations which receive 
larger aid allocations experience lower subsequent levels of private investment.  
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a recent debate by Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012a, 2013a) on ‘the effect of foreign 
aid’ that has had an important influence in academic and policy making circles. Hence, contrary 
to the above protagonists, we introduce an indirect dimension to the debate
3
.  
 In addition to the above contributions, the paper leaves room for policy implications in a 
number of areas. Firstly, the global economic downturn has ignited issues about donor’s 
continued willingness to give and commitment to development assistance (Ahmed et al., 2011). 
Therefore, investigating the incidence of aid on investment could provide additional insights into 
the ongoing debate
4
. Secondly, a corollary of the first contribution is the shifting of policy space 
to development assistance alternatives from East Asia. Accordingly, the ability to learn from the 
East Asian success stories has been substantially hampered by an asymmetric bargaining power 
between African and Western development partners
5
. Thirdly, there have been considerable 
shifts in the objectives announced by the donor community which have evolved from intensive 
industrialization programs advocated in the 1950s to more recent poverty-reduction objectives 
such the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Therefore, with the year 2015 approaching, 
the study also leaves room for policy options to donor and multilateral agencies on the aid 
objectives towards increasing investment. Fourthly, by using much recent data (1996-2010) in 53 
countries, we provided an updated account of the nexuses. Moreover, the richness of our dataset 
enables more focused policy implications. Accordingly, to add subtlety to the analysis, we 
disaggregate the countries into fundamental characteristics of investment (legal origins, 
petroleum exporting quality, political instability/conflicts, regional proximity, income-levels, 
religious domination and openness to sea). 
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 The Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012a, 2013a) debate has focused on the direct effect of foreign aid. 
While the former has concluded that foreign aid is positive for institutional quality in developing countries, the latter 
has established that the findings of the former may not be relevant for African countries. The position of Asongu 
(2013a) has been validated by Asongu (2015a) and Asongu (2015b) using dynamic cultural settings and institutional 
benchmarks for the effectiveness of foreign aid respectively. . 
4
 The debate has recently been reframed by Koechlin (2007) who has examined three ambitious book (Sachs's The 
End of Poverty, Bhagwati's In Defense of Globalization, and Easterly's The Elusive Quest for Growth) and 
concluded that, the insights and drawbacks of these three books remind us that the status quo is not working and that 
a rich understanding of globalization and development requires a serious consideration of alternative visions of each. 
For instance, novel visions of theorizing development in light of the globalized system of food production has 
included the USA led ‘genetically modified food aid’ to the Southern African region that is widely criticized by the 
European Union (Herrick, 2008).  
5
 As a case in point, the Chinese ‘cooperative and non-interference’ oriented development assistance and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) policies in Africa are perceived as better alternatives. Hence, the results of this study could 
either solidify the narrative or negate it.  
 6 
 The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 presents conflicts in 
the literature before proposing the endogenous theory. Data is discussed and the methodology 
outlined in Section 3. The empirical analysis is covered by Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Foreign aid and development  
 
2. 1 Conflicts in the literature  
While development assistance is necessary in the short-run owing to certain precarious 
circumstances (humanitarian concerns for example), there has been a heated debate on the 
effectiveness of aid on the one hand and the linkage among aid, conditionality
6
 and economic 
policies in recipient countries. In international policy coordination, one of the most debated and 
controversial issue is foreign aid. A strand of protagonists has presented a case with a mixture of 
alleged altruism, economic interests, geo-strategic considerations and historical ties (Alam, 
2004). The post-decolonization period has been characterized by substantial increase in grants 
and soft loans from Western donor agencies and governments (Oya, 2006). In essence, the Cold 
war and the battle for geopolitical control in African between superpowers are considered by 
many scholars as the most important determinant of soaring aid in the 1980s (Degnbol-
Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003). The debate has also been extended to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) led policies
7
.  
 We now devote space to highlighting the debate in strands. A substantial bulk of the 
literature has been devoted to the macroeconomic consequences of development assistance. 
However, mixed results have been reported and studies that have concluded on a significant and 
positive effect have faced heavy methodological criticisms. Inconclusive results with recently 
refined methodologies, heavy reliance on empirical evidence and the absence of analytical 
framework (Masud & Yontcheva, 2005), have left much room for debate on the aid-development 
nexus. Table 1 below summarizes the debate in two main strands. Whereas the first strand 
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 The conditionality oriented debate has recently intensified when some Western governments (British and US for 
instance) have threatened to cut-off aid to some African countries because of the prosecution of gays, lesbians and 
transsexuals by governments of recipient countries. In response, activists, analysts and African government officials 
have viewed the threat as an insult to African values in particular and moral wellbeing in general.  
7
  Accordingly, structural adjustment policies by the IMF have also been criticized. There is a wealth of literature 
documenting that the IMF’s neoliberal policies have been: not sound for South Korean development after the 1997 
crisis (Crotty & Lee, 2002, 2006, 2009); the principal cause of the Argentinean crisis in the late 1990s and early 
2000s (Levy & Duménil, 2006) and responsible for the failed privatization projects across Africa (Bartels et al., 
2009).  
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acknowledges the positive sides of development assistance, the second sustains the negative 
consequences of aid. 
 Among studies in the first strand, we shall highlight that of Burnside & Dollar (2000) 
which has concluded that aid could be effective when policies are appealing (conducive). The 
Burnside & Dollar study has received abundant comments from scholars and policy makers 
(Guillaumont & Chauvet, 2001; Colier & Dehn, 2001; Easterly et al., 2003) with some claiming 
that findings are extremely data dependent (Clemens et al., 2004). Whereas Clemens et al. 
(2004) have established that aid is beneficial in the short-term; Minou & Reddy (2010) have 
recently found that the beneficial effect could also be in the long-term. Gomanee et al. (2003) 
have emphasized that development assistance has both a direct effect on welfare and an indirect 
impact through public spending on social services. The indirect stance has been further 
consolidated by Mosley et al. (2004) on wellbeing and poverty in recipient countries. 
Development assistance has also been found to promote institutions in terms of its role on 
corruption (Okada & Samreth, 2012) and transition to democracy (Resnick, 2012).  
 The second strand entails authors that have presented a case for the insignificant effect of 
aid on investment, savings and institutions. It has been concluded that aid promotes unproductive 
public consumption (Mosley et al., 1992) without a positive incidence on investment. The latter 
stance has been sustained by Reichel (1995) and Boone (1996). Whereas Ghura (1995) has 
emphasized the negative impact of development assistance on domestic savings, Pedersen (1996) 
has established that, foreign aid distorts development and leads to aid dependency. In direct 
response to the Okada & Samreth (2012) position on a negative aid-corruption nexus, recent 
African aid-oriented literature has supported this second strand from an institutional standpoint. 
Accordingly, Asongu (2012a, 2013a) has engaged in a debate on the ‘effect of foreign aid on 
corruption’ that could have a significant influence in academic and policy making circles8.  
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 Whereas Okada & Samreth (2012) have concluded that aid mitigates corruption in developing countries, Asongu 
(2012a) in direct response has established that the Okada & Samreth (2012) findings may not be relevant for Africa 
because aid fuels (mitigates) corruption (the control of corruption) in the continent.  In response to some informal 
discussions that the Okada & Samreth and Asongu (2012) findings are not directly comparable, Asongu (2013a) has 
sustained his position in the African context without partially negating the empirical underpinnings of Okada & 
Samreth on the one hand and extending the horizon of inquiry from corruption to eight government quality 
dynamics.  
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Table 1: Summary of conflicts in the literature  
Researchers Main findings 
 
First-strand: Aid improves growth (development) 
 
Ghura (1995) Aid positively impacts savings for good adjusters.  
  
Burnside & Dollar (2000) Aid can be good when economic management and policies are appealing. 
  
Guillaumont  &  Chauvet (2001) Aid effectiveness is conditional on environmental factors (hazards and shocks). 
  
Collier & Dehn (2001) Aid effectiveness is contingent on negative supply shocks. Targeting aid 
conditional on negative supply shocks is better than a targeting based on good 
policies.  
  
 
Collier & Dollar (2001) 
The positive impact of aid on poverty depends on its effect on per-capita 
income growth and the effect of per-capita income growth on poverty 
mitigation. 
  
 
Feeny (2003) 
The sectoral allocation of foreign aid to Papua New Guinea has been broadly 
in line with a strategy to effectively mitigate poverty and increase human 
wellbeing.  
  
Gomanee et al. (2003) Aid has both a direct impact on welfare and indirect effect via public spending 
on social services.  
  
Clement et al. (2004) Aid has a short-run appealing impact on growth. 
  
Ishfaq (2004) Though in a limited way, aid has helped in reducing the extent of poverty in 
Pakistan. 
  
Mosley et al. (2004) Aid has an indirect impact on wellbeing and poverty in recipient countries. 
  
Addison et al. (2005) Aid augments pro-poor public expenditure and has a positive impact on 
economic prosperity. Aid broadly works to reduce poverty, and poverty would 
be higher in the absence of aid. 
  
Fielding et al. (2006) There is a straight forward positive impact of aid on development objectives.  
  
Minou & Reddy (2010) Aid positively impacts economic prosperity in the long-run. 
  
Okada & Samreth (2012)  Aid mitigates corruption.  
  
Resnick (2012) Aid has promoted democratic transitions in the 1990s in African countries.  
  
  
Second-strand: Aid does not lead to growth (development) 
  
Mosley et al. (1992) Aid promotes unproductive public consumption and fails to promote growth. 
  
Reichel (1995) Aid does not encourage savings because of the substitution effect. 
  
Ghura (1995) Aid has a negative incidence on savings. 
  
 
Boone (1996)  
Aid is insignificant in promoting economic development on two main counts: 
poverty is not the effect of capital shortage and it is not optimal for politicians 
to adjust distortionary policies when they receive aid flows. 
  
Pedersen (1996) Aid distorts development and eventually leads to aid dependency. 
  
Asongu (2012a)  Aid fuels (mitigates) corruption (the control of corruption). 
  
Asongu (2015c)  Aid has a negative nexus with government quality dynamics.  
  
Asongu (2013a) Aid is unappealing to institutional quality irrespective of initial levels of 
institutional development.  
  
Source (Authors) 
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Whereas the effect of development assistance is more straight forward to some scholars 
(Ishfaq, 2004; Addison et al., 2005; Fielding et al., 2006)
9
, its incidence on development 
outcomes may also be indirect. We have highlighted in the second strand above that aid 
promotes unsound public consumption (Mosley et al., 1992) without a positive effect on 
investment. We have also highlighted in the introduction that aid affects development objectives 
through fiscal behavior channels (Morrissey, 2012). Therefore aid effects on tax effort and 
government spending could provide incentives for investment needed for economic prosperity.  
 
2.2 Theoretical proposition: fiscal behavior as a transmission mechanism 
 
2.2.1 Theoretical and empirical underpinnings   
 
 The theoretical underpinnings of the fiscal behavior channel in the aid-development 
nexus are broadly consistent with the ‘Bush-Push’ model which sustains that Africa is poor 
because it is stuck in a poverty trap (Easterly, 2005). In order to emerge from the hollow, it needs 
a large aid-financed increase in investment: a ‘Big Push’. Both the Harrod-Domar and Solow 
growth models have been based on this intuition. Accordingly, the underlying assumption for the 
intuition is that, the ‘Big-Push’ is destined to bridge the saving-investment gap poor countries 
face (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966; Easterly, 2005).  
 Empirically, a great chunk of studies have focused on the incidence of aid flows on GDP 
growth and other macroeconomic variables (investment or public consumption). Gomanee et al. 
(2003) have established that aid has both a direct impact on welfare and an indirect effect via 
government spending on social services. The indirect position has been sustained by Mosley et 
al. (2004) on wellbeing and poverty in recipient countries. While we have already highlighted 
the importance of aid increasing unproductive public consumption (Mosley et al., 1992) without 
necessarily increasing investment, the intuition for the thesis has been confirmed by Addison et 
al. (2005) who have found that aid strengthens pro-poor public expenditure. On the premise of 
very recent aid-development literature, donors are concerned about the manner in which their 
                         
9
 Addison et al. (2005) have established that development assistance encourages pro-poor public spending and has a 
positive incidence on economic prosperity (growth) since it broadly works towards poverty reduction. Their position 
that poverty would be higher in the absence of aid had earlier been raised by Ishfaq (2004). Among proponents of a 
positive aid-development nexus in the first strand of Table 1, Fielding et al. (2004) have been the most optimistic in 
their conclusion that aid has a straight forward positive incidence on development objectives. 
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assistance affects the fiscal behavior (tax effort and government spending) of recipient countries 
(Morrissey, 2012). 
 In light of the above, two dimensions clearly standout: the investment destination of aid 
and the fiscal behavior mechanism as a channel to the investment. Hence, the goal of the present 
study is to propose an endogenous theory of aid and test the empirical validity of the proposed 
theory. In essence, we examine how aid affects private investment (and gross fixed capital 
formation) through tax efforts and government spending. The model is primarily based on the 
assumption that, private investment and/or gross fixed capital formation are relevant for 
economic prosperity.  
 
2.2.2 Theoretical proposition: extension of Barro (1990) 
 
 There is a wealth of literature substantiating that the taxation system adopted by a 
developing country creates large distortions that substantially affect the dynamics of the private 
sector and hence economic growth and development (Manly et al., 2006; Feredeand & Dahlby, 
2012). As already highlighted above, some of this vast literature has focused on the channels via 
which foreign aid affects economic prosperity in recipient countries (see Table 1). In the same 
vein, recent endogenous growth literature has elucidated the positive role of public spending: 
education, health and infrastructure on economic growth (Alexiou, 2009).  The literature 
substantially draws from the Barro (1990) model.  
 In essence, Barro determines the optimal size of the State: public expenditure that 
maximizes the rate of economic growth. The simple growth model does not take into account the 
issue of budget deficit allocated to public spending. Hence, it is intuitively relevant to propose a 
model that incorporates development assistance destined to financing productive public 
expenditure. Therefore, the idea here is to extend Barro’s simple growth model while taking into 
consideration the effect of foreign aid on private investment through the fiscal behavior of the 
State. As we must have highlighted above, in line with Barro’s theoretical underpinnings, we 
suppose that, productive investments may either be private investments or gross fixed capital 
formations that have positive incidences on economic growth.  
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a) Simple model 
 We consider a model similar to Barro (1990). The economy is characterized by the 
decision of a household representative agent who is a consumer and a producer with the 
following production function: 
 gAkgky  1),(               (1) 
where k is physical capital, g the amount of composite productive public expenditure entailing: 
education, infrastructure and health. This public expenditure is financed by income tax to which 
is added an allocation to foreign aid. That is: 
A(t)y(t)g(t)                                (2) 
where A(t) is the amount of international aid which is indexed on national income and we 
suppose that it is determined in an exogenous manner.  
 For the purpose of simplicity, we further suppose that the budget of the State is at 
equilibrium at every moment. Accordingly, the problem of our representative agent is to solve 
the dynamic program of decentralized economic growth given by:  
          dt
tc
c
Max .
t-
e 0 1
11)(
  







            (3) 
0.k(0)
ay(t)A(t)
A(t)y(t)g(t)
c(t) - y(t) )   - 1()(





tk
 
where a is the indexation rate of foreign aid allocated to the production of social infrastructure  
g(t) . This rate is exogenous, fixed and considered as given by national economic agents.  In this 
institutional environment, the result of Barro’s model of economic growth can be characterized 
without the indexation of foreign aid output, as follows:  
 
Proposition 1: (Barro, 1990) 
(i) The rate of decentralized economic growth without foreign aid is given as:  
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(ii) The rate of direct income tax that maximizes the economic growth rate is given by:                                           
)( ArgMax                  (5) 
b) Public finance, aid and endogenous growth  
 We have already seen that a substantial bulk of the literature has focused on the incidence 
of aid on growth and development. The theoretical and empirical relevance of aid to public 
spending has also been highlighted. Now we suppose that the objective of donor(s) vis-à-vis poor 
countries is the development of the private sector (liberal aspect of the contract). Hence, its 
(their) aid is supposed to be entirely and observably allocated directly to the financing of 
productive public spending flows, which can be lacking in poor countries and whose role is to 
ameliorate socio-economic infrastructure which improve the effectiveness (promotion) of the 
private sector. Within this framework, it can be established that the equation for budget 
equilibrium is given this time by:  
  )()(
)()()(
tyatg
tgtayty




       (6) 
In the presence of foreign aid destined for private sector promotion, while acknowledging that 
aid as an exogenous factor, public decision makers should therefore implement an endogenous 
economic growth program by the optimal choice of the income-related direct tax structure. 
Hence, public policy decision making would have to solve the following dynamic problem:  
dt
tc
c
Max .
t-
e 0 1
11)(
  







     (7)        
0.k(0)
ay(t)A(t)
A(t)y(t)g(t)
c(t) - y(t) )   - 1()(





tk
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Proposition 2: in the presence of foreign aid, the economic growth rate is given by the following 
rate:      
               
          










 ρα1
α
τ)τ)(a-(1α-1
1
A   
σ
1
      a     (8) 
 
The tax rate that maximizes national economic growth is therefore given by: 
a
a
a


1
     0    )1(                     (9)        
It is immediately observable that, the positive effect of aid reduces that burden of the taxation 
system on the private sector of poor countries, especially when the amount of aid is high and the 
public sector less effective. Hence, it is observed that aid granted to developing countries directly 
benefits in terms of private sector dynamism which ultimately leads to economic growth while 
reducing the size of the national public sector (Remmer, 2004; Payne & Kumazawa, 2005).  
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 We examine a panel of 53 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB) for the period 1996-2010. Limitation to the time span 
is motivated by the interest of providing results with updated and more focused policy 
implications. Moreover, the focus on Africa and the time span enable the follow-up of a recent 
foreign aid debate that has had some influence in academic and policy making circles
10
. The 
dependent variables are private investment and gross fixed capital formation. While the former is 
used in baseline regressions, the latter is employed for robustness checks.   
 
 
 
                         
10
 The time span is consistent with those employed by Okada & Samreth (2012), Asongu (2012a) and Asongu 
(2013a) in the debate highlighted above. The first authors have use data on 120 developing countries for the period 
1995-2009, the second has used data on 52 African countries for the period 1996-2010 whereas the third has used 
data for the period 1996-2010 from 53 African countries.  
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3.1.1 Determination of fundamental characteristics 
 It is important to discuss the determination of fundamental characteristics which are 
crucial for the relevance of the empirics. Macroeconomic characteristics have the limitation of 
being time-dynamic. Thus, the same non-dummy threshold may not be consistent over time. This 
justification is even more relevant when short-run (business cycle) disturbances loom quite large. 
Hence, we are consistent with recent comparative literature in categorizing countries in terms of 
conflict-affected (or political instability), petroleum-exporting, legal origins, income-levels, 
regional proximity, religious domination and landlocked-nature (Weeks, 2012; Asongu, 2014de).  
From intuition, foreign aid, private investment and fiscal policy substantially depend on the 
above categories. 
 On a first note, the ‘conflict affected’ characteristic present analytical and practical issues 
as difficulties arise in assigning countries to this strand in a non-arbitrary and exclusive manner. 
Since, few countries in the continent are completely conflict-free, the distinction is made on the 
basis of degree of significance of conflict-span relative to the period of study. Based on the 
information (53 countries over the period 1996-2010), two strands emerge: civil wars and 
political strife. With respect to the first strand on civil wars, few would object to the inclusion of 
Angola (1975-2002), Burundi (1993-2005), Chad (2005-2010), Central African Republic (series 
of failed coup d’états between 1996-2003 and the 2004-2007 Bush War), Congo Democratic 
Republic, Côte d’Ivoire (1999 coup d’état, 2002-2007 civil war, rekindled in 2011), Liberia 
(1999-2003), Sierra Leone (1991-2002), Somalia and Sudan. For the second strand, in spite of 
the absence of some formal characteristics of civil war, we also include Nigeria and Zimbabwe 
due to the severity of their internal strife.  
 Secondly, on how to determine petroleum countries, a critical categorical objection arises 
because some petroleum countries also clearly qualify as conflict-affect (Angola and Sudan for 
instance). We impose no constraints on categorical priority; meaning a country may fall in many 
categories if it has the relevant categorical characteristics. Another concern that crops-up is 
arbitrariness if a country qualifies for only part of the time period, either because of recent 
discovery or substantially declined production. Seemingly, another objection could be that, some 
producers (Botswana for instance) have displayed macroeconomic features that are similar to 
petroleum exporting countries. We take a minimalistic approach to the issue by strictly adhering 
to the petroleum category and including only countries whose exports have been oil-dominated 
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for over a decade during the span 1996-2010. These include: Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, 
Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria and Sudan.  
 Thirdly, the basis of legal origin is founded on the premise that, legal origins place 
different emphasis on private property rights vis-à-vis State power (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999). 
According to this narrative, English common law countries place more emphasis on private 
property rights, whereas French civil law focuses more on State power. The intuition for this 
category has recently been confirmed in African institutional quality (Asongu, 2012bc) and 
property rights (Asongu, 2014d) literature. The underlying logic for this segmentation is that the 
institutional web of formal rules, informal norms and enforcement characteristics affect the 
climate of investment. The legal origin classification is according to La Porta et al. (2008, p. 
289).  
 Fourthly, the basis for including income-levels to examine wealth-effects is founded on 
two premises. On the one hand, economic prosperity could be associated with higher levels of 
private investment. On the other hand, recent African institutional literature has shown that 
wealth-effects matter in institutional quality (Asongu, 2012b, 2013bc) that ultimately determines 
investment. The choice of income-levels is in accordance with the Financial Development and 
Structure Database (FDSD) of the WB.  
 Fifthly, there is an investment cost of being landlocked (Arvis et al., 2007). Moreover, in 
order to add subtlety to the analysis for more policy implications, we include religious 
dominations (Christianity and Islam) in accordance with the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
(2011) World Fact book, and regional proximity in terms of SSA and North African countries.  
 
 
3.1.2 Endogenous explaining, instrumental and control variables  
 The fiscal policy measures in terms of government expenditure and tax revenues are 
consistent with the theoretical and empirical underpinnings discussed above (Rostow, 1960; 
Chenery & Strout, 1966; Mosley et al., 1992; Boone, 1996; Addison et al., 2005; Reichel, 1995; 
Easterly, 2005; Morrissey, 2012). The instrumental variables include: Total Net Official 
Development Assistance (NODA), NODA from Multilateral Donors (MD), NODA from the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries and Grants excluding technical 
cooperation. We employ only two control variables due to constraints in degrees of freedom 
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required for the Sargan over-identifying restrictions (OIR) test for instrument validity
11
. The 
control variables are corruption and voice & accountability and are included to reduce the degree 
of identification when development assistance instruments are not valid.  The choice of the 
control variables is consistent with recent African institutional literature (Asongu, 2012a, 2013a).  
 Appendix 1, Appendix 2, Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 respectively provide details about 
the summary statistics, correlation analysis (showing the basic correlations between key 
variables used in this paper), variable definitions (with corresponding data sources) and 
categorization of countries.  The summary statistics of the variables show that there is quite a 
degree of variation in the data utilized so that we should be confident that reasonable estimated 
relationships should emerge. The purpose of the correlation matrix is the mitigate issues of 
muliticollinearity (and overparameterization) and from the correlation coefficients, there do not 
appear to any serious concern in terms of the nexuses to be estimated.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 The study uses a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation 
strategy on two main counts: the empirical strategy is consistent with the problem statement and 
also addresses the issue of endogeneity. The following steps are adopted in the estimation 
procedure.  
First-stage regression:  
 itit sInstrumentFB )(10  it                                      (1)                                                                                                          
Second-stage regression:   
 itit FBInvestment )(10  itiX   it                   (2)           
In Eq. (2), X is a set of control variables which include: Corruption and voice & 
accountability
12
. FB entails Fiscal behavior which encompasses Government’s final 
                         
11
 The Sargan OIR test is only applicable in the presence of over-identification. In other words, the instruments must 
be higher than the endogenous explaining variables by at least one degree of freedom. In the cases of exact-
identification (instruments equal to endogenous explaining variables) and under-identification (instruments less than 
endogenous explaining variables) the OIR test is by definition impossible. Accordingly, we have four foreign aid 
instruments and cannot model with more than three endogenous explaining variables. 
12
 There is a broad consensus on the imperative for good institutions for African development and foreign aid 
effectiveness (Fosu, 2013ab; Wantchekon, 2003;Gibson et al., 2014; Vicente & Wantchekon, 2009; Anyanwu & 
Erhijakpor, 2014; Boyce & Ndikumana, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2011). 
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consumption expenditure and Tax revenues. Investment denotes Private investment and Fixed 
capital formation. Instrumental variables include: Total NODA, NODA from DAC countries, 
NODA from MD and Grants. For Eq. (1) and Eq (2),  v  and u, respectively represent the error 
terms.  
In the estimation process, three main steps are adopted. First, we justify the choice of the 
IV procedure with a Hausman test for endogeneity. Then, we verify that the instruments are 
exogenous to the endogenous components of the independent variables (government expenditure 
and tax revenues). Last, we ensure that the instruments are valid and uncorrelated with error term 
in the equation of interest with an OIR test. Further robustness checks are ensured with: (1) 
restricted and unrestricted modeling; (2) modeling with robust Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors and; (3) usage of two investment indicators.  
 
4. Empirical Analysis  
 
4.1 Presentation of results 
 In this section, we aim to assess two main issues: (1) the ability of the exogenous 
components of fiscal behavior to explain private investment and; (2) the ability of the 
instruments to explain private investment through the proposed fiscal policy channels. Whereas 
the first concern is addressed by the significances and signs of estimated coefficients, the second 
issue is tackled with the Sargan OIR test. The null hypothesis of this test is the stance that, the 
aid instruments explain private investment only through the fiscal policy channels. Therefore, a 
rejection of the null hypothesis is a rejection of the perspective that the foreign aid instruments 
do not explain private investment beyond the proposed mechanisms. We also employ a Hausman 
test to account for endogeneity and justify the choice of the 2SLS-IV estimation strategy. The 
null hypothesis of this test is the position that estimated coefficients by OLS are consistent and 
efficient. Thus, failure to reject this null hypothesis does not lend credit to the choice of the 
estimation strategy since it undermines the concern of endogeneity. Owing to the problem 
statement and theoretical underpinning, the Hausman test is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for the employment of the 2SLS-IV strategy. Therefore, even in the absence of 
endogeneity (failure to reject the null of the Hausman test), we still employ the IV procedure.  
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 In Table 2 below, we report a summary of the findings in Tables3-4. While Table 3 is the 
baseline assessment with private investment, Table 4 is a robustness check with fixed capital 
formation. Modeling is restricted (Panel A) and unrestricted (Panel B) in both tables. While 
Tables 3-4 examine both the first and second concerns highlighted above, Table 2 is premised on 
only the second concern. Accordingly, owing to the problem statement, the second issue is more 
relevant than the first because it is premised on evidence from the first concern. In other words, 
while addressing the first issue does not guarantee the second can be tackled, examining the 
second is feasible when the first has been confirmed. Therefore, the summary in Table 2 is based 
on the following information criteria: (1) the estimated coefficient should be significant; (2) the 
adjusted coefficient of determination (R²) should not be negative; (3) the Fisher statistics should 
be significant; (4) the null hypothesis of the Sargan OIR test for the validity of the foreign aid 
instruments should not be rejected  and; (5) the Hausman test has an informational role and is not 
indispensible for the validity of the 2SLS-IV model specification.  
 From Table 2, the following broad conclusions could be established. (1) Foreign aid 
overwhelmingly increases private investment and gross capital formation through tax effort, 
which is consistent with theoretical underpinnings of and propositions in the study. (2) While the 
incidence of foreign aid on the dependent variables through government expenditure is a bit 
mixed, the weight of available evidence on the second issue broadly supports its positive impacts 
on private investment and gross fixed capital formation. (3) It could be further inferred that, 
while the tax effort effect is consistent across fundamental characteristics of investment, the 
government spending impact may change as one move from on fundamental characteristic to 
another. Hence, whereas the homogeneity on the tax effort mechanism strongly confirms our 
theoretical postulations, the heterogeneity of the government spending channel indicates that 
generalization of the findings with respect of the government expenditure mechanism should be 
treated with caution.  (4) Our findings are more relevant in restricted than in unrestricted 
modeling. This is an indication that, autonomous investment is not a very valid channel through 
which foreign aid is instrumental in private investment. (5) Given the overwhelming presence of 
not applicable (na)
13
 and degree (°)
14
 signs, it is difficult to establish significant asymmetries in 
                         
13
 insignificant estimate or variable not included in model.  
14
 °: negative coefficient of determination, significant Sargan OIR test (invalid instruments) or insignificant Fisher 
statistics. 
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various dimensions of common fundamental characteristics. Therefore, evidence of wealth-
effect, legal-origin-effect…. landlocked-effect cannot be feasibly drawn.  (6) But for a thin 
exception (conflict affected countries), most of the significant control variables have the rights 
signs: voice & accountability and corruption-control are logical incentives for private investors 
because they improve the climate of doing business.  
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Table 2: Summary of results 
                  
 Income Levels Legal Origins  Religious Dom. Regions  Resources  Stability  Landlocked(LL) Africa 
 UMI LMI MI LI English French Christ. Islam SSA NA Oil Non-oil Conflict Non-co. LL Not LL  
  
 Panel A: Specifications in Panel A of Table 3 (Restricted Private Investment Modeling)   
Gov. Exp.  - na na na + na + -° + -° +° + -° + + na na 
                  
Tax Rev.  + +° + + + +° + +° + +° na + na + + + + 
                  
 Panel B: Specifications in Panel B of Table 3 (Unrestricted Private Investment Modeling)   
Gov. Exp.  na na na na na na na na na na + na na na na na na 
                  
Tax Rev.  na na na na + na na na na + + na + na + na na 
                  
                  
 Panel C: Specifications in Panel A of Table 4 (Restricted Fixed Capital Formation Modeling)   
Gov. Exp.  - na na na + -° na - + -° + + - + + na na 
                  
Tax Rev.  + +° + + + +° + + + +° + + na + + +° + 
                  
                  
 Panel D: Specifications in Panel B of Table 4 (Unrestricted Fixed Capital Formation Modeling)   
Gov. Exp.  na na na na na na na na na na + na na na na na na 
                  
Tax Rev.  na + na na + na na + na + + na + na na na na 
                  
Gov. Exp: Government Expenditure. Tax Rev: Tax Revenue. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English 
Common-law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries.  SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  NA: North Africa. Oil: Petroleum 
exporting countries. Non-oil: Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-co: Countries without significant 
political instability. Dom: Domination. na: insignificant estimate or variable not included in model. °: negative coefficient of determination, significant Sargan OIR test (invalid 
instruments) or insignificant Fisher statistics. +(-): positive (negative) effect.  
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Table 3: Baseline Assessment with Private Investment (HAC standard errors) 
                  
 Income Levels Legal Origins Religious Dom. Regions Resources Stability Landlocked (LL) Africa 
 UMI LMI MI LI English French Christ. Islam SSA NA Oil Non-oil Conflict Non-co. LL Not LL  
 Panel A: Restricted Modeling  
Constant  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
                  
Gov. Exp.  -0.60** 1.064 1.951 0.301 0.475** 0.004 1.062* -0.43** 1.003* -1.32** 0.385* 0.894* -0.128** 0.977* 0.673*** 0.506 -0.310 
 (0.016) (0.325) (0.270) (0.446) (0.046) (0.983) (0.097) (0.011) (0.050) (0.049) (0.053) (0.070) (0.031) (0.070) (0.000) (0.354) (0.862) 
Tax Rev. 0.66*** 0.568** 0.512* 0.822*** 0.52*** 1.16*** 0.567*** 0.84*** 0.55*** 2.10*** 0.154 0.58*** 0.066 0.643*** 0.504*** 0.919*** 0.475** 
 (0.000) (0.017) (0.071) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.212) (0.000) (0.751) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) 
C. Control 4.383 6.888 --- --- -0.164 9.567 --- --- --- --- --- --- -5.07*** --- --- --- -18.134 
 (0.752) (0.492)   (0.972) (0.103)       (0.000)    (0.369) 
Voice & A. --- --- 17.69** --- --- --- 2.710 -1.469 --- 22.60** --- --- --- 2.966 --- 14.728** --- 
   (0.029)    (0.828) (0.733)  (0.013)    (0.793)  (0.041)  
                  
Hausman  67.6*** 18.37*** 51.87*** 19.88*** 45.5*** 17.9*** 56.78*** 35.0*** 38.0*** 57.5*** 0.035 34.7*** 110*** 46.60*** 10.58*** 32.40*** 84.39*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.982) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sargan OIR 0.425 14.29*** 1.210 1.538 1.391 6.74** 1.035 1.354 3.768 0.294 7.594* 4.484 0.381 3.007 2.598 3.138 2.074 
 (0.808) (0.000) (0.545) (0.673) (0.498) (0.034) (0.595) (0.508) (0.287) (0.862) (0.055) (0.213) (0.826) (0.222) (0.457) (0.208) (0.354) 
Adjusted R² 0.215 0.203 0.110 0.032 0.083 0.251 0.073 -0.061 0.054 -0.074 0.878 0.073 -0.101 0.088 0.123 0.147 0.115 
Chi-Square --- --- --- 147*** --- --- ---  91.7*** --- 14391*** 120*** --- --- 113*** --- --- 
Fisher  152*** 45.07*** 23.73*** ---- 107*** 40.7*** 20.13*** 34.2*** --- 46.6*** --- --- 2e^4*** 26.06*** --- 22.40*** 16.75*** 
Observations 34 51 87 77 72 72 111 35 155 26  8 176 13 140 57 103  
                  
 Panel B: Unrestricted Modeling  
Constant  63.22 21.83*** 16.06** 12.925 5.582** 15.7*** 20.405 11.6*** 12.843 43.4*** 7.414*** 13.340 -25.1*** 13.340 -9.278 17.29*** 14.294 
 (0.595) (0.000) (0.039) (0.207) (0.031) (0.003) (0.184) (0.000) (0.433) (0.003) (0.000) (0.335) (0.000) (0.335) (0.408) (0.004) (0.372) 
Gov. Exp.  -0.108 0.135 0.039 -0.028 0.179 -0.038 0.325 0.061 -0.105 --- 0.180*** -0.078 0.104 -0.078 -0.020 0.103 -0.501 
 (0.917) (0.840) (0.975) (0.890) (0.305) (0.874) (0.570) (0.783) (0.912)  (0.000) (0.917) (0.186) (0.917) (0.933) (0.771) (0.766) 
Tax Rev. -1.614 0.056 0.219 0.092 0.34*** 0.371 -0.212 0.140 -0.014 0.61*** 0.092*** 0.027 0.75*** 0.027 0.66*** 0.131 0.005 
 (0.718) (0.459) (0.361) (0.873) (0.000) (0.200) (0.714) (0.565) (0.982) (0.000) (0.000) (0.959) (0.000) (0.959) (0.000) (0.680) (0.991) 
C. Control  -7.935 20.55*** --- --- -1.549 13.8*** --- -2.309 -6.986 --- --- -4.247 -18.1*** -4.247 -17.347 --- -7.932 
 (0.578) (0.000)   (0.496) (0.005)  (0.729) (0.459)   (0.637) (0.000) (0.637) (0.166)  (0.643) 
Voice & A. --- --- 15.51** 2.062 --- --- 6.749 --- --- 44.6*** --- --- --- --- --- 13.49*** --- 
   (0.014) (0.526)   (0.532)   (0.009)      (0.000)  
                  
Hausman  33.5*** 6.758* 27.76*** 0.988 4.854 2.948 9.767** 2.007 7.002* 15.8*** 4.719* 4.359 90.40*** 4.359 9.713** 12.18*** 4.254 
 (0.000) (0.080) (0.000) (0.804) (0.182) (0.399) (0.020) (0.570) (0.071) (0.000) (0.094) (0.225) (0.000) (0.225) (0.021) (0.000) (0.235) 
Sargan OIR 0.013 1.033 1.110 1.134 1.641 1.132 1.365 1.240 2.725* 1.076 1.514 3.027* 0.004 3.027* 0.773 0.160 1.326 
 (0.907) (0.309) (0.292) (0.286) (0.200) (0.287) (0.242) (0.265) (0.098) (0.583) (0.468) (0.081) (0.945) (0.081) (0.379) (0.688) (0.249) 
Adjusted R² -0.065 0.494 0.109 -0.024 0.052 0.273 0.029 -0.006 0.181 0.150 0.818 0.150 0.395 0.150 0.009 0.127 0.138 
Chi-Square --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Fisher  14.0*** 42.97*** 2.409* 0.525 7.92*** 4.25*** 0.450 0.768 0.421 31.9*** 155*** 0.176 72.74*** 0.176 20.12*** 4.565*** 0.090 
Observations 34 51 87 59 72 72 111 35 118 26 8 138 13 138 42 103 144 
                  
Instruments  Constant, Total NODA, NODADAC, NODAMD, Grants 
                  
***, **,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. P-values in parentheses. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: Middle 
Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries.  SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  NA: North 
Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-oil: Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-co: Countries without significant 
political instability. Gov. Exp: Government Expenditure. Voice & A: Voice & Accountability. Tax Rev: Tax Revenues.  HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. NODA: Net Official 
Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee. MD: Multilateral Donors. NODADAC: NODA from DAC countries. NODAMD: NODA from Multilateral Donors. The relevance 
of bold values that depict the information criteria is threefold. 1) Rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hausman test for the presence of endogeneity. 2) The significance of estimated 
coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 3) The failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan OIR test for instrument validity. 
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Table 4: Robustness Assessment with Fixed Capital Formation (HAC standard errors) 
                  
 Income Levels Legal Origins Religious Dom. Regions Resources Stability Landlocked (LL) Africa 
 UMI LMI MI LI English French Christ. Islam SSA NA Oil Non-oil Conflict Non-co. LL Not LL  
 Panel A: Restricted Modeling 
Constant  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
                  
Gov. Exp.  -0.59* 1.366 2.328 0.957 0.541** -0.267* 1.301 -0.4*** 1.833** -1.1*** 0.330* 1.589* -0.112** 1.574** 1.388*** 0.460 0.0349 
 (0.099) (0.229) (0.293) (0.265) (0.022) (0.086) (0.239) (0.000) (0.031) (0.009) (0.090) (0.036) (0.016) (0.025) (0.000) (0.504) (0.987) 
Tax Rev. 0.87*** 0.819*** 0.775** 1.10*** 0.75*** 1.29*** 0.69*** 1.42*** 0.72*** 1.75*** 0.47*** 0.808*** 0.255 0.784* 0.69*** 1.291*** 0.662*** 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.166) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
C. Control  4.956 8.550 --- --- -2.740 -2.196 --- --- --- --- --- --- -5.03*** --- --- --- -23.717 
 (0.000) (0.555)   (0.601) (0.885)       (0.000)    (0.351) 
Voice & A. --- --- 18.691** --- --- --- -8.026 3.475 --- 7.467 --- --- --- -1.407 --- 16.26** --- 
   (0.045)    (0.719) (0.641)  (0.103)    (0.941)  (0.047)  
                  
Hausman  58.4*** 31.97*** 59.21*** 48.28*** 71.9*** 25.8*** 84.99*** 70.5*** 83.8*** 127*** 1.153 89.88*** 115*** 79.14*** 32.77*** 40.55*** 186*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.561) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sargan OIR 0.627 15.98*** 1.504 1.123 0.506 25.0*** 3.389 3.542 3.740 0.162 3.321 4.755 0.243 4.413 3.909 5.038* 2.831 
 (0.730) (0.000) (0.471) (0.771) (0.776) (0.000) (0.183) (0.170) (0.290) (0.921) (0.344) (0.190) (0.885) (0.110) (0.271) (0.080) (0.242) 
Adjusted R² 0.075 0.272 0.068 0.105 0.165 0.100 0.014 0.305 0.050 -0.052 0.872 0.081 -0.135 0.064 0.070 0.182 0.087 
Chi-Square  --- --- --- 104*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 6e^4**
* 
150*** --- --- 162*** 28.77*** --- 
Fisher  485*** 29.92*** 25.83*** --- 133*** 56.5*** 36.95*** 273*** 91.3*** 276*** --- --- 5e^4*** 51.07*** --- 40.55*** 25.05*** 
Observations 34 57 93 80 72 81 111 44 158 32 8 186 13 149 60 109 153 
                  
 Panel B: Unrestricted Modeling 
Constant  62.370 26.3*** 21.89** 3.831 6.996** 28.2*** 42.601 13.7*** 23.449 38.4*** 7.11*** 21.828 -19.4*** 21.828 11.966 24.76*** 23.127 
 (0.405) (0.000) (0.017) (0.915) (0.026) (0.000) (0.453) (0.000) (0.185) (0.002) (0.000) (0.145) (0.000) (0.145) (0.244) (0.000) (0.157) 
Gov. Exp.  -0.106 -0.099 -0.358 0.555 0.170 -0.332 -0.237 -0.111 0.318 --- 0.13*** 0.146 0.067 0.146 0.033 -0.141 -0.217 
 (0.870) (0.870) (0.785) (0.191) (0.396) (0.279) (0.909) (0.175) (0.795)  (0.000) (0.889) (0.314) (0.889) (0.818) (0.717) (0.902) 
Tax Rev. -1.375 0.235* 0.381 0.747 0.52*** 0.088 -0.936 0.48*** -0.235 0.54*** 0.41*** -0.092 0.79*** -0.092 0.363 0.153 -0.125 
 (0.631) (0.074) (0.166) (0.723) (0.000) (0.794) (0.667) (0.000) (0.744) (0.000) (0.000) (0.878) (0.000) (0.878) (0.196) (0.628) (0.820) 
C. Control -7.194 27.1*** --- --- -4.476 15.187* --- -0.764 -2.976 ---- --- -3.778 -15.1*** -3.778 -5.617 --- -6.447 
 (0.676) (0.000)   (0.107) (0.067)  (0.828) (0.744)   (0.687) (0.000) (0.687) (0.536)  (0.645) 
Voice & A. --- --- 16.05** -6.247 --- --- 0.406 --- --- 27.9** --- --- --- --- --- 13.857** --- 
   (0.015) (0.624)   (0.987)   (0.036)      (0.017)  
                  
Hausman  27.0*** 18.34*** 36.09*** 5.545 8.400** 12.6*** 24.59*** 4.334 24.9*** 23.1*** 0.043 17.1*** 64.8*** 17.16*** 2.364 22.79*** 18.03*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.135) (0.038) (0.000) (0.000) (0.227) (0.000) (0.000) (0.978) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.500) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sargan OIR 0.265 0.170 1.209 1.451 0.025 2.604 1.679 0.054 2.692 0.328 3.532 3.005* 0.017 3.005 0.012 0.183 1.796 
 (0.606) (0.680) (0.271) (0.228) (0.874) (0.106) (0.194) (0.815) (0.100) (0.848) (0.171) (0.082) (0.896) (0.082) (0.909) (0.668) (0.180) 
Adjusted R² -0.099 0.573 0.074 0.002 0.132 0.289 0.146 0.319 0.045 0.370 0.937 0.127 0.310 0.127 0.132 0.108 0.248 
Chi-Square  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Fisher  1.096 28.41*** 2.535* 0.843 98.6*** 2.082 0.495 6.80*** 0.792 57.6*** 463*** 0.373 112*** 0.373 1.600 2.754** 0.266 
Observations  34 57 93 62 72 81 111 44 121 32 8 147 13 147 45 109 153 
                  
Instruments Constant, Total NODA, NODADAC, NODAMD, Grants 
                  
***, **,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. P-values in parentheses. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: Middle 
Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries.  SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  NA: North 
Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-oil: Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-co: Countries without significant 
political instability. Gov. Exp: Government Expenditure. Voice & A: Voice & Accountability. Tax Rev: Tax Revenues.  HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. NODA: Net Official 
Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee. MD: Multilateral Donors. NODADAC: NODA from DAC countries. NODAMD: NODA from Multilateral Donors. The relevance 
of bold values that depict the information criteria is threefold. 1) Rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hausman test for the presence of endogeneity. 2) The significance of estimated 
coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 3) The failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan OIR test for instrument validity. 
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4.2 Discussion of results, policy implications and caveats  
 
4.2.1 Discussion of results 
 
 From the weight of available empirical evidence (summarized in Table 2), we have found 
an overwhelming homogenous effect of tax effort on investment. Since, the results are consistent 
with the proposed theory; the explanation for the positive nexus conditional on foreign aid has 
already been substantially covered in Section 2. Hence, the instrumentality of foreign aid in the 
positive nexus could be explained from the fact that development assistance reduces the tax 
effort of the government which provides additional incentives for private investment (either in 
terms of reinvested profits or improvement of the investment climate). The explanation extends 
to the formation of fixed capital (Table 4).  Another explanation to the positive relationship is 
that Western donor agencies could require tax institutions to be more accountable and void of 
corrupt practices and mismanagement. Hence, the previously siphoned funds by corrupt officials 
are transferred to the private sector. A third elucidation to the positive nexus could be due to a 
lower composition of loans in the development assistance portfolio. This is especially the case 
with countries under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.  
 We have also found that, the findings for the government expenditure channel are 
heterogeneous or not consistently positive across fundamental characteristics of private 
investment. The key idea to understanding this heterogeneity is that the degree by which corrupt 
officials chose to spend money on goods whose true value is hard to identify may differ across 
fundamental characteristics. Hence, the negative nexus could be traceable to funds that are used 
for those expenditures that provide more lucrative opportunities for bribery (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1993). Accordingly, expenditure on military and high technology goods are some candidates for 
providing lucrative opportunities for corrupt officials. Corruption in military spending has been 
found to be closely linked, especially in military aircraft (Hines, 1995)
15
. On the other hand, the 
positive nexus could be attributed to expenditures that do not seem to provide any opportunities 
at all for corrupt officials and ultimately create favorable conditions for private investments. 
Expenditure in education is a case in point. For example, it would be difficult for a government 
official to collect bribes for the appointment of unqualified persons to teaching positions. This 
                         
15
 It is therefore not surprising that the worst post-apartheid corruption scandal that has embroiled the current 
president (Jacob Zuma) has been linked to the purchase of military equipment. In the same line of thinking (from a 
high technology standpoint), the ‘Albatross’ jet affair that has  rocked the Cameroonian institutional landscape has 
seen the arrest of many high profile politicians over the spectacular disappearances of $ 25 million destined for the 
purchase of a presidential plane.  
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line of elucidation could more or less be extended to health, although it is also disputable that 
sophisticated hospital equipment could give rise to opportunities of corruption
16
. This 
explanation confirms recent findings that corruption is linked to low spending on education and 
health in developing countries (Mauro, 1998; De la Croix & Delavallade, 2007). 
 Since, the negative nexus of government expenditure is contrary to the proposed 
theoretical underpinnings, it is relevant to devote space to explaining the discussion in the 
preceding paragraph to elaborate detail with hard stylized facts. It is worthwhile noting that the 
project approach to foreign aid has underestimated the incentive problems with aid delivery. 
Hence, education and health ministries in recipient countries must be motivated to get school 
inputs and medicines (respectively) to citizens. More so, donor bureaucracies themselves must 
have the incentives to make sophisticated infrastructural projects successful. Firstly, with respect 
to education, whereas enrollments have expanded rapidly, the quality of education has been 
hampered by missing inputs like textbooks and other school materials, corruption in education 
bureaucracies and weak incentives for teachers (Filmer & Pritchett, 1997). Secondly, from a 
health standpoint, some of the initial progress in Africa has slowed possibly due to the siphoning 
of funds (Easterly, 2005, p. 8). Studies in Cameroon, Guinea, Tanzania and Uganda estimate that 
30 to 70% of government drugs disappear before they get to patients and complicated health 
issues cannot be solved in the absence of routine methods (Filmer et al., 2000; Prichett & 
Woolcock, 2004).  Thirdly, with regard to the bureaucracy of sophisticated projects, there have 
been some alarming dysfunctional signs. For example, donors have spent over $2 billion over the 
past 20 years on roads in Tanzania, but the roads have not improved. The principal output has 
been aid bureaucracy because about 2400 reports have been provided by 1000 donor missions 
and government experts each year. The three points discussed in this paragraph could be 
summarized with another example from Swaziland. It is a good aid candidate that substantially 
relies on foreign aid, spends about 55% of its public spending on the wage bill, loses nearly 
double the annual social service budget to corruption, sells food aid and deposits the money in 
foreign bank accounts…etc. The above points have one common denominator: foreign aid 
channeled through dubious government expenditure mechanisms (that serve only the interests of 
                         
16
 To further illustrate this point, a recent budget scandal in South Africa has been the government’s spending of R4 
billion on entertainments, travel allowance and catering in 2011 while under-spending in health initiative, which has 
left about 47% of metropolitan South Africans dissatisfied.  
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corrupt officials) may not provide the rights incentives for the growth of private investment and 
fixed capital formation needed for economic prosperity in recipient countries.  
 
4.2.2 Stimulating private investment with foreign aid through constraints on fiscal behavior 
 The main policy implication arising from this study is that, donor agencies can condition 
aid to improve the fiscal system and management of aid-related government expenditure in order 
to facilitate the inflow of private investment and accrual of fixed capital needed for economic 
growth. Hence, we shall briefly discuss ‘revenue side’ and ‘expenditure side’ constraints on 
which development assistance can be conditioned in order to improve the fiscal behavior of 
recipient countries.  
 On the revenue dimension of fiscal management, the following constraints are worth 
noting. Firstly, a tax administration reform will observe that, the implementation of important 
anti-corruption measures within the tax administrations, which include updating and 
modernizing tax agency procedures; restructuring of internal organization based on function 
(identification, assessment, billing…etc) instead of by ‘type of tax’; reducing the number of 
clearances that are needed from taxpayers to complete compliance processes (i.e., the number of 
certifications, signatures, forms…etc); limiting the discretionary power of tax officials; tax 
liability self-assessment and exploring the use of electronic filling. Secondly, semi-autonomous 
revenue authorities are also vital. In essence, when properly implemented, this enclave 
dimension to tax administration reform will augment the possibility of de-politicizing tax 
officials, increase wage levels for tax officials and strengthen internal monitoring mechanisms. 
Consistent with the literature (Talercia, 2003; Bird, 2004; Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2006; 
Asongu & Jellal, 2013, 2014), these semi-autonomous authorities have already been introduced 
in countries as diverse as Bolivia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Guatemala, Ghana, 
Guyana, Kenya, Malawi, Mexico, Peru, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Venezuela 
and Zambia. Thirdly, reforms of the tax system can reduce lucrative opportunities for tax 
officials. Simplification of the tax system by reduction of the number of discretionary tax 
incentives, deductions and exemptions is also worthwhile.  
 From the supply perspective of fiscal management, the following constraints are 
advisable. Firstly, a modern treasury system should be installed in a bid to augment transparency 
in cash management and disbursement of resources for items authorized in the budget, needed 
for the consistency between formulation and execution. It is also relevant for the treasury to 
operate separately from spending agencies and discretionary power of treasury officials can be 
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reduced by separating departments responsible for each budget execution stage. Secondly, 
financial management reforms should be requested by aid agencies in order to solidify basic 
procedures on budget accounting, auditing and reporting. In essence, the public expenditure 
management should make use of the integrated financial management systems and information 
technologies. Thirdly, a procurement system reform should be required to facilitate the 
establishment of standardized procurement processes, ensure maximum exposure and 
competition of foreign and national bidders as well as satisfy international procurement 
standards. On account of the fact that procurement systems can be particularly useful if 
combined with the necessary administrative capacity, independent audition of the procurement 
procedures should be conducted regularly and reviewed by parliament. Thirdly, a public 
expenditure tracking system should be developed to identify leaks in the budget implementation 
stage. Fourthly, civil service reform should be oriented towards key measures that mitigate the 
probabilities of patronage and corruption such as: reduction of turnover rates, merit-based 
recruitment, professionalization and de-politicization of public servants. Fifthly, a 
comprehensive coverage of the budget should minimize extra-budgetary and off-budget accounts 
in order to maximize transparency in the use of public resources. Seventhly, strategies that 
emphasize political accountability and political representation are necessary since broad political 
contestability decreases the opportunities of state capture. It is also worthwhile for ordinary 
citizens to have access to relevant information concerning public spending, including 
parliamentary debates on the budget formulation.  
 In addition to imposing constraints to ameliorate fiscal behavior of aid-recipient countries 
form the revenue and expenditure sides, donors should also require an intergovernmental fiscal 
structure that favors the decentralization of spending responsibilities and revenue sources. This 
will provide increased accountability to citizens and improve local government’s greater 
autonomy, which can be instrumental in mitigating corruption in aid-funded projects.  
 
4.2.3 Caveats and future research directions 
 
 In light of the theoretical underpinnings of the paper, the study has not taken two major 
elements into account. Firstly, it would be interesting to decompose government expenditure into 
its constituent elements in order to understand which components favor private investment 
activities more. This is essentially because corrupt officials would always try to channel aid-
funds to those expenditures that provided more lucrative opportunities for bribery and 
mismanagement. Secondly, the distinction between concessional loans and grants in the 
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measurement of development assistance will enable a better understanding of the instrumentality 
of foreign aid in the investment-fiscal policy nexuses. For instance, the type of foreign aid that 
augments/reduces the tax effort related to private investments. Hence, interesting future research 
directions could include the incorporation of above caveats in order to provide policy makers 
with more specific findings.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The paper has provided theoretical and empirical justifications for the instrumentality of 
foreign aid in stimulating private investment and fixed capital formation through fiscal policy 
mechanisms. We have proposed an endogenous growth theory based on an extension of Barro 
(1990) by postulating that the positive effect of aid mitigates the burden of the taxation system 
on the private sector of recipient countries. The empirical validity is based on 53 African 
countries for the period 1996-2010. While the findings on the tax effort channel are 
overwhelmingly consistent with theory across specifications and fundamental characteristics, 
those of the government expenditure channel are a little heterogeneous but broadly in line with 
the theoretical postulations. Justifications for the slight heterogeneity, policy implications, 
caveats and future directions have been discussed.   
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics 
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations 
       
Investment  Private Investment  12.979 9.400 -2.437 112.35 658 
Fixed Capital Formation    19.708 10.715 -23.76 113.58 706 
       
Fiscal 
Behaviour   
Government Expenditure   4.392 12.908 -57.815 90.544 468 
Tax Revenues  17.693 10.096 0.116 61.583 262 
       
Control 
variables  
Corruption Control Index   -0.607 0.623 -2.495 1.086 622 
Voice & Accountability    -0.674 0.734 -2.174 1.047 636 
       
 
Instrumental 
variables  
Total  NODA 10.811 12.774 -0.251 148.30 704 
NODA from DAC countries  6.244 8.072 -0.679 97.236 704 
NODA from Multilateral Donors 4.481 5.512 -1.985 64.097 704 
Grants  0.069 0.115 0.000 1.477 773 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Categorization  
Upper Middle Income 0.188 0.391 0.000 1.000 795 
Lower Middle Income 0.226 0.418 0.000 1.000 795 
Middle Income 0.415 0.493 0.000 1.000 795 
Low Income  0.584 0.493 0.000 1.000 795 
English  0.377 0.485 0.000 1.000 795 
French  0.622 0.485 0.000 1.000 795 
Christianity  0.622 0.485 0.000 1.000 795 
Islam   0.377 0.485 0.000 1.000 795 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.886 0.317 0.000 1.000 795 
North Africa  0.113 0.317 0.000 1.000 795 
Oil  0.188 0.391 0.000 1.000 795 
Non-oil 0.811 0.391 0.000 1.000 795 
Conflict  0.226 0.418 0.000 1.000 795 
Non-conflict  0.773 0.418 0.000 1.000 795 
Landlocked  0.283 0.450 0.000 1.000 795 
Not Landlocked  0.716 0.450 0.000 1.000 795 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis  
           
Fiscal Behavior Control variables Foreign Aid and Grants Investment  
Gov. Ex Tax rev CC V&A T.NODA NODADAC NODAMD Grants Priv Ivt GFCF  
1.000 0.098 0.082 0.012 0.039 0.038 0.021 0.036 0.054 0.111 Gov. Ex 
 1.000 0.508 0.317 -0.309 -0.304 -0.277 -0.290 0.448 0.551 Tax rev 
  1.000 0.665 -0.146 -0.148 -0.123 -0.117 0.151 0.330 CC 
   1.000 -0.0009 0.002 -0.002 0.018 0.153 0.212 V& A 
    1.000 0.995 0.900 0.808 -0.222 -0.084 T. NODA 
     1.000 0.733 0.780 -0.181 -0.070 NODADAC 
      1.000 0.716 -0.240 -0.097 NODAMD 
       1.000 -0.174 -0.091 Grants 
        1.000 0.895 Priv Ivt 
         1.000 GFCF 
           
Gov. Ex: Government Expenditure. Tax rev: Tax revenues. CC: Corruption Control. V& A: Voice & Accountability. NODA: Net Official 
Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee. MD: Multilateral Donors. T.NODA: Total NODA. NODADAC: NODA 
from DAC countries. NODAMD: NODA from Multilateral Donors. Piv Invt: Private Investment. GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation.  
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions (Measurement) Sources 
    
Corruption  Control  
Index  
CC Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of 
the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private 
interests. 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Voice & Accountability 
 
V&A 
Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government and to enjoy freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and a free media. 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Government Expenditure  Gov. Ex Government Final Consumption Expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Tax Revenue  Tax rev. Tax Revenue (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Fixed Capital Formation   GFCF Gross Fixed Capital Formation  (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Private Investment  Priv. Ivt Gross Private Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign Aid (1) Total  Aid Total Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign Aid (2) DAC Aid NODA from DAC Countries (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign Aid (3) DAC Aid NODA from Multilateral Donors (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Grants  Grants  Grants excluding technical cooperation (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee.  
 
Appendix 4: Categorization of Countries 
Category  Panels Countries Num 
    
 
 
Income 
Levels 
Upper Middle 
Income  
Algeria, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao 
Tome & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa.  
10 
   
Lower Middle 
Income  
Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Lesotho, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia. 
12 
   
Middle 
Income  
Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tunisia.  
   22 
   
 
Low Income  
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo 
Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
 
31 
    
 
Legal 
Origins  
English 
Common-law 
Botswana, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
    20 
   
 
French Civil-
law  
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia. 
 
33 
    
 
Religious 
 
 
Christianity  
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
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 30 
Domination Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
   
Islam  Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, The Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia. 
20 
    
 
 
Regions  
 
 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, 
Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
   47 
   
North Africa  Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania,   Morocco, Tunisia. 6 
    
 
Resources  
Petroleum 
Exporting 
Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Libya, Nigeria, Sudan.  
10 
   
 
Non-
Petroleum 
Exporting  
 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic,  Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Egypt, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,  Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe.  
 
43 
    
 
Stability  
Conflict  Angola, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe.  
  12 
   
 
 
Non-Conflict  
Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,  Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros,  
Congo Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Libya,  Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Senegal, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia. 
 
41 
    
 
Openness to 
Sea 
Landlocked  Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
15 
   
 
Not 
landlocked 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo Democratic 
Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Liberia, 
Libya,  Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,  Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia. 
 
38 
    
Num: Number of cross sections (countries) 
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